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1 Introduction1
The new political economy (NPE) - perhaps more
accurately called 'economic politics' - has applied
to political 'markets' or to political action in eco-
nomic markets the profit and utility maximizing
assumptions which underlie neoclassical econom-
ics (Basu 1991) to show the conditions of rent
seeking2 under which individually rational behav-
jour on the part of bureaucrats3 impedes the col-
lective economic good, leads to economically
irrational outcomes and overwhelms 'good policy
advice' (Krueger 1974). While the soft policy
options both required by NPE and acquired from it
form a lengthy and messy agenda4, the hard option
is less contested and is entirely consistent with the
macroeconomic theoretical background underlying
the first decade of structural adjustment. This
involves deregulation: - in extreme states the limi-
tation of the state to the protection of private prop-
erty rights and the enforcement of 'voluntary
private contracts'.5
While NPE does not require the individually ratio-
nal behaviour of bureaucrats to be corrupt, corrup-
tion, when defined as the 'clearing response to the
inefficient distribution of free public goods'
(Jagganathan 1987: 110), is entirely consistent
with this theoretical approach and its policy
implications.
1
am grateful to S. Adnan, EA. Brett, S. Guhan, T.
Hyat, D. Jayaraj, S. Janakarajan, MI-1. Khan, P.J.
Krishnamurthy, CT. Runen, J. Mooij, N. Narayanan,
WK. Olsen, J. Rapley, R.Roy and D.G. White for
discussion and helpful reactions to a draft but the
inadequacies remaining are my own.
2 Rent seeking is understood here as the use of resources
to obtain politically created rents.
And on occasions a conflated category of 'bureaucrat-
politician' which is referred to by either designation.
Increase information to curb rent seeking; use law to
restrict the activities of those most prone to rent seeking;
raise bureaucrats' salaries; tax rent seeking activities; use
rent-seeking status to prioritise deregulation
(Jagganathan 1987; Grindle and Thomas 1991).
(Krueger 1974; Buchanan 1980; Basu 1991 and
critically discussed in Grindle and Thomas 1991). The
sequencing of privatization and liberalization, of inter-
and intra- sectoral contraction, the mix of capital and
current expenditure in a compressed state sector are
contentious policy issues, all of which follow from the
deregulation agenda (Cornia and Stewart 1990).
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Jagganathan (ibid.) for instance (acknowledging his
debt to Wade 1985) distinguishes three sorts of cor-
ruption for 'India' according to location within the
bureaucracy The first and second are very similar:
1) the traditional revenue collection/registration
functions of the state and ii) the developmental
functions of the state. Both face excess demand.
Type i) is characterized by chronic institutional
scarcity Corruption is not the only response to
such scarcity Nepotism is also both rational and
common as a rationing mechanism. Public officials
become discriminating monopolists. In type ii) cor-
ruption, privately appropriable benefits are per-
ceived to be provided by public services e.g. the
delivery of newly created supposedly common
property rights (health, irrigation, roads, control
over necessary inputs e.g. fertiliser). The third type
is fraud: 'the exploitation of information asymme-
tries within the bureaucracy to defraud the exche-
quer'. Type iii) happens when public agencies are
not accountable and/or when public opinion is
unaware and a feeble regulator. Officials may
become private co-owners, or creditors of contract-
ing firms and simultaneously contract awarders. In
all three forms of corruption, intangible property
rights result and can be purchased.
Here, the bribe is not a transfer with a socially neu-
tral impact. It is distinctly ambivalent. On the one
hand, it is an 'efficient' reward to the entrepreneur-
ial drive of the bureaucrat. On the other, it is an
incentive for the bureaucratic propagation of corrupt
sites (by restricting activity and then accepting a
rent preferentially to ration it at price which may be
formed under a variety of competitive conditions
depending upon assumptions about bureaucratic
structure and organization) (Shleifer and Vishny 1993).
Deregulation will then remove the positions where
this 'systematic exploitation of illegal income earn-
ing opportunities' in the public sector is possible.
By contrast, this article is a preliminary attempt to
examine the opposite proposition - that a reduction
of state controls may be accompanied by increased
corruption.
Even within the stylized world of NPE, there are
several reasons why its prediction that deregulation
will reduce corruption may be confounded. First,
partial changes in ownership (as with quango-ization)
may multiply sites for corruption by complicating
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lines of accountability and by diluting enforcement
capacity Second, there will be no change in cor-
ruption under privatization if the state continues to
regulate economic conduct directly or indirectly
through quasi-state organizations. Then some busi-
ness interests may use corrupt means to maintain
access to resources or exemptions, while other
interests will bribe to enforce deregulation and
increase the territory of market exchange. Third,
officials may seek bribes against promises of future
economic rents, given that their tenure outlives that
of politicians.
The prediction grounded in NPE can also be dis-
cussed with empirical material. It is not surprising
that corruption - the 'great black hole of develop-
ment economics and public policy' (Jagganathan
1987: 116) - is easier to theorize than to analyse
empirically As Leys (1965) pointed out long ago,
there is a 'widespread feeling that the facts cannot
be discovered or that if they can, they cannot be
proved, or that if they can be proved, the proof can-
not be published' for reasons either of research
diplomacy or of social science conventions about
validity Here we will use empirical material gath-
ered as a by-product of research on the develop-
ment (despite, or because of, noticeable government
neglect) of a small South Indian market town over
two decades.
Three propositions will be explored:
i that the overall process of capital accumula-
tion is as important to corruption as is the
bureaucrat;
ii that bureaucratic corruption is but a subset of
its commonly observed forms;
iii that deregulation may be accompanied by an
increase in corruption and by mutations in
relations of corruption.
The concept of corruption as it is practised and
experienced in the town under study is in line with
the definition given in 1964 by the then influential
Santhanam Report on the Prevent of Corruption:
'all forms of impropriety or selfish exercise of
power and influence attached to a public office
or to the special position one occupies in public
life'. This is a broad brush definition, but accords
with my understanding of what local citizens mean
when they use the word.
2 Primary and Primitive
Accumulation as a Motor
of Corruption
The maximizing behaviour of bureaucrats in cor-
rupt exchange theorized as 'markets' neglects the
social relations by which corrupt transactions are
'demanded' (or funds for corruption are 'supplied')
by the non-bureaucratic party to the corrupt con-
tract. Talk of 'market clearing' asserts one form of
corrupt exchange and yet obscures the mechanisms
by which there might be a 'market' in the first place.
My empirical evidence suggests that three types of
relation are particularly important in supplying the
means whereby the non-bureaucratic party engages
in corrupt transactions, and in enabling intangible
private property rights to be created over public
goods and services in the first place: tax evasion,
exploitative labour relations and fraud and eco-
nomic crime. In this article we have room to dis-
cuss only the first of these.6
Tax evasion
Widespread, large scale tax evasion is entrenched in
India. As long ago as the early 1980s it was esti-
mated that 41-58 per cent of potentially taxable
income from all sources escaped taxation and that
in specific instances of commercial taxation on agri-
cultural products non-compliance amounted to
possibly 80 per cent of potential revenue.7 There is
a trade-off between the costs of, and returns to, tax
collection which creates incentives to organize pro-
duction and commerce in units below the various
thresholds. Below the threshold the art of avoid-
ance is practised while above them the craft of eva-
sion prevails. In the business economy of the South
Indian market town all but the pettiest of commer-
cial firms had net returns before tax above the
income tax threshold of Rs 45,000 p.a. Little tax is
paid. Bus companies for instance keep no accounts
at all and the income tax of owisers is collectively
negotiated. Commercial taxation is also avoided
by pre-emptive development and evaded with
6 See Harriss-White, 1996, for the second and third with
reference to agricultural trade elsewhere in South India.
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corruption. The first is instanced by the burgeon-
ing scrap metal sector where commercial taxes are
levied on the first purchase. The sector is struc-
tured around a sizeable number of independent
small wholesalers whose gross output is beneath
the commercial tax threshold and who bulk and sell
to a small number of large wholesalers (whose 'sec-
ond purchases' are therefore tax exempt). In prac-
tice, all the apparently independent small
wholesalers are completely financed by the large
wholesalers and are poorly disguised wage labour.
The second evasion is instanced by groundnut,
subject to cascading taxes at every stage, which are
extensively evaded by means of verbal, spot con-
tracts with immediate cash payment. Thus the only
commodity whose conditions of transaction
remotely resemble those of perfect competition
assumes this particular and rare contractual form
specifically to escape state intervention.
The failure to pay local municipal taxes has a dire
effect on municipal finance and its implications for
urban development are far reaching. Over a period
of two decades, taxes raised from the very poorest
categories (from the bullock- and horse-cart stands
and from stalls in the municipal market) con-
tributed nearly as much as those from all inhabi-
tants with taxable property and income. The
Municipality appears to tax people earning less than
its own employees, but is unable or unwilling to tax
the elite. Three interpretations suggest themselves:
a class conspiracy (between officials and the
commercial elite);
ii the political weakness of local government in
the face of the commercial elite;
iii the local government's lack of legitimacy, such
that tax evasion represents a 'principled protest'
by the economic elite at the high spend on
salaries and the low spend on infrastructure: a
set of circumstances which is likely to be self-
perpetuating, if not self-reinforcing.
Tax evasion fuels a black economy characterized by
a large black financial sector, by tendencies to invest
Goswami et al. 1991; Harriss 1984. It is estimated that
a mere seven million Out of a total population of over
1,000 million Indians pay income tax.
in real estate rather than production, by short-term
finance and investment, by the privatization of civic
services and by pervasive relations of corruption.
Avoidance and evasion, while legally distinct activi-
ties, are both part of the tactical armoury of private
accumulation.
3 The Social Locations of
Corruption
There are respects in which local-level state institu-
tions are considerably more progressive than are
their market counterparts: 40 per cent of municipal
employees are from scheduled castes and 43 per
cent are women. The structure of wages in state
institutions is more egalitarian than that of the com-
mercial workforce (though absolute pay levels are
lower). While throughout the Indian state, uncor-
rupt individuals are to be found, local level corrup-
tion is widely experienced to be much more
extensive and systematic than it was 20 years ago.
It takes a greater variety of mutually intersecting
forms:
j Bureaucratic corruption. This includes 'commis-
sions' paid to employees of nationalized banks for
loans; expansion of property rights on official posts,
promotions and transfers (sometimes - as in the
case of entrance to the police sub-inspectorate -
using bribery to screen applicants in the wake of
open competition); complex modes of purchase of
state regulated goods (e.g. liquor) with bribes at
every stage (for the permit, transport certificate, and
records of payment at the bank and lifting at the
store); multiple bribes for the acquisition of a good
or service (one for the transaction, another for
speed and a third for certification); and discre-
tionary valuation (e.g. under the Stamp Duty
Prohibition Act 67 where a registrar undervalues
property for stamp duty by an amount which is
shared between registrar and transacting parties).
This category also includes pre-emptive bribery and
extortion. Those sectors of the bureaucracy with
the role of vigilance or control are bribed so as not
to harass their clients (classically, in the field of
industrial audit and income taxation). Technically
incompetent officials are bribed so that the 'victim'
can gain irregular access to a competent official;
vigilance and inspection officials privately appropri-
ate fines so that offenders can avoid penalties for
breaches of regulatory law. The practice of official
34
'sunlighting' is also widely regarded as corrupt since
it deviates from bureaucratic norms, intensifies the
rationing of their work time, lengthens queues and
increases incentives for bribes to gain preferential
access.
ii Judicial corruption. This is one aspect of an
alleged deterioration of professional conduct.
Certain lawyers are said to be corrupt intermedi-
aries between clients and judicial officers so that
criminal and civil cases are increasingly selectively
prioritized, judgements warped and the implemen-
tation of judgements delayed.
iii Political corruption. This is the most com-
monly reported form. lt may take the form of inter-
mediation e.g. the political negotiation of an
indefinite delay to a work-force pay rise agreed by
employers after a strike; the political invasion of a
cooperative board of management, which proceeds
to embezzle commodities from the cooperative; or
the political appropriation of 'donations' required
for entry to Teachers' Training Institutes.
Bureaucratic corruption has been politicized over
time, in a trend which can be illustrated through
the case of bus transport. Bus routes should be allo-
cated bureaucratically according to closed tender
proceedings and bus fares are capped by adminis-
trative fiat. However, administrative corruption
over time ensured a 'clearing response' type of pri-
oritization of routes according to returns, net of
wear and tear, which matched the ranking of bribes.
In the next phase, this administrative rent-seeking
discretion was subjected to political capture.
Politicians have inserted themselves as regulators
and fund collectors and routes are doled out peri-
odically in a 'public' meeting of politicians and bus
owners according to the latter's individual roles in
electoral and party political funding. Thus the
political executive both commands the administra-
tion and captures the formerly private rents they
gathered. Even more recently, the collective politi-
cal investments of bus owners themselves have
borne fruit in the form of discriminatory policy
changes timed to disadvantage the state's own
public bus transport and to advantage private
owners. This is a more subtle form of corruption
(also theorized by Khan and Roy in this issue)
wherein the state subverts its popularly mandated
or otherwise legitimated development project to
benefit powerful economic interests. Political
corruption may bypass the bureaucracy entirely,
the implementation of favours from corrupt align-
ments being administered according to political
command in an entirely legal and orthodox manner.
Here officials are far from being principals and pri-
vate sector clients far from being agents.
While bureaucratic earnings are comparatively low,
and low-risk, the commercial elite tolerates long
and extremely costly waits in order to lodge kin
(routinely and corruptly) in the bureaucracy
Administrative positions have high economic and
non-economic entry barriers and are in effect
investments (made with funds derived from pri-
mary accumulation) requiring returns (derived
from corruption). Symbiotic economic relations
develop between business, the administration and
the ruling political party Furthermore, the under-
funding of state institutions as a result of tax eva-
sion results in an understaffing and a resource
scarcity which reinforces bureaucratic and political
incentives for rent-seeking. Poor quality, easily sab-
otagable law raises questions about the intentions
underlying law and the possibility of corrupt coali-
tions between legislators, administrators and the
judiciary The impoverished nature of training for
political office at state level (due to a history of sup-
pression of democratic local government) favours a
verdict of incompetence rather than conspiracy on
the part of legislators. But the resultant, apparently
widely ramified skeins of corruption satisfies a
broad set of interests so effectively that the conse-
quences of incompetent law making are indistin-
guishable from that of a conspiracy
Flows of money up and down political networks
solidify social relations of tribute and clientelage
which run closely parallel to those of state revenue
and development. Under a populist regime, funds
(originating mainly in the commercial economy)
may flow upwards, be centralized and subsequently
redistributed to the mass of potential voters in the
form of money as pre-election sweeteners.8 In a
predatory state, centralized funds may also be
privately appropriated and used for conspicuous
8 Wade described similar relations for village councils
and the irrigation bureaucracy in his Village Republics
(1988).
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consumption. Under a patrimonial political regime,
they may be reallocated into semi-legitimate forms
of politicized bureaucratic provision or commercial
investment. Thus the distribution of gains from
political corruption is central to party politics and
to state forms.
4 Regulation, Deregulation,
Accumulation and Corruption
Ever since Independence, commercial regulation
by state intervention has had a variety of develop-
ment objectives in which the suppression of open
market rent-seeking and equitable public provision
of basic goods and services have figured promi-
nently In suppressing open market rent-seeking,
opportunities are created for bureaucratic rent-
seeking. Further, the curbing of corruption and
black marketing by state regulation not only entails
direct bureaucratic costs, and the transaction costs
of compliance to the parties involved, but also
reproduces and multiplies the very structural
conditions it is intended to regulate. This is well
illustrated by what are by now the 'classic' com-
modities, the distribution of which is still widely
thought to require state regulation (e.g. grain,
cloth, fertiliser, kerosene, liquor), and activities
such as moneylending and the private provision
of public transport. In every case, corruption is, so
far as we can judge, mandatorily and routinely
entailed at each stage of the transactions, involving
a wide range of parties in consequence (such as
store-keepers, check-post guards, police, officials
and labourers).
The question is whether, given the conditions we
have described, deregulation is any better at guar-
anteeing compliant, unexploitative and orderly eco-
nomic behaviour. Part of the answer may be sought
by examining how minimally regulated market
exchange presently obtains order, Despite, or
because of , widespread corruption, a strong sys-
tem of ethics orders and protects the commercial
economy9 Business contracts are mostly oral and
traders respect one another's property Market
exchange is strongly structured not to by open
This is no 'generalized morality' of the sort Platteau
argues underlies market exchange (1994). On the
contrary the commerce we have researched is underlain
by a pluralist ethical system (see Harriss-White 1996).
contract-forming processes but by tight persistent
networks of repeated transactions, established
hereditarily or through long processes of appren-
ticeship or induction, i.e. with high non-economic
barriers. In such networks, trust and reputation
are as important structuring principles as is power,
and all are simultaneously deployed. Repeated
contracts develop normative extra-contractual
obligations, the breaking of which (by trading
outside them) may affect reputation and even
lead to exclusion. With the development over the
least two decades of complex and sophisticated
long distance trade with non face-to-face con-
tracts, the nature of the reputation - and trust -
based networks has changed. Ascribed reputation
(on the basis of family, caste or locality) is being
replaced by acquired reputation (on the basis of
reliability or efficiency). In the town we study,
social relations of commerce are still strongly rooted
in institutions of ascription. Acquired reputation
factors are most evident in long distance networks
for new commodities, the products of corporate
industry
Regulation by reputation is as important for some
kinds of ultimate client as it is for merchants. In the
black financial economy, for caste-insiders, reputa-
tion is crucial for creditworthiness, for terms and
conditions. It is still inherited. If repayment is
delayed, the possibility of future loans elsewhere is
jeopardized. People will stay in very oppressive
credit and debt relations rather than let reputational
failure affect their children and family With a
reported increase in corruption, with the prevalence
of adulteration, quackery and incompetence, the
importance of reputation as a mechanism of regu-
lating conduct cannot be underestimated.
However, enforcement is also carried out by private
security forces: 'goondas'. The locations of these
institutions of regulation are very precise. In the
black financial economy, social outsiders such as
marwaris employ a visible coercive squad to
enforce repayment. The extra-contractual obliga-
tion of paddy producers indebted to paddy mundy
owners to sell all marketed surplus (not merely
that which repays loans) is regulated by collusion
and force. Moreover, mercenary forces are amassed
by local political bosses to protect returns to their
investments. It is the black and the 'political'
economy which tends to use extra-legM force.
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Formal institutions are more successful in regulat-
ing labour relations than commodity exchange.
Certain parts of the urban labour force are union-
ized and strikes over working conditions are regu-
lar events. However, organization by competing
political parties weakens the work-force by divid-
ing it and works in the favour of management.
Much of the working population of the town is
collectively regulated: e.g. market-place coolies
and cartmen whose associations set entry barriers
and unilaterally fix job-rates. The paddy and rice
sector is poorly organized, however, and work
conditions for casual female labour are the poorest
remunerated and most physically oppressive. By
and large the regulation of the urban work force
is achieved by the strategic use of family labour.
Such labour is both controllable and trustable.
Power and trust run together and structure much
of the regulation of the labour force in the commer-
cial economy
Finally, the market town has a total of 25 profes-
sional associations based on occupation, a fledgling
chamber of commerce plus two ginger groups for
consumer welfare and urban development. These
collective institutions appear superficially as regu-
latory bodies to whom disputing parties would be
expected to turn. They can establish norms of con-
duct for transactions and for the adjudication of
disputes. But such regulatory activity is rarely put
into practice. In fact, these associations i) defend
members from threat - from organized labour and
from the government; ii) organize collective bribes
in the general interest of members; iii) exclude
entrants; and iv) perform small acts of redistributive
charity At closer gaze many are tight networks of
interest cemented by caste and kin, exemplifying
how old institutions such as kinship are being put
to new economic roles.
These kinds of regulatory institutions conspicu-
ously fail to control an enormous amount of minor
disorder in market exchange which never reaches
'official' notice. Such disorder includes adulter-
ation and tampering with price and brand labels
or weights and measures, pervasive agency prob-
lems, such as the underdeclaration of turnover
to owners by managers; the above-norm appro-
priation of earnings (e.g. by bus conductors); rogue
extra - contractual behaviour; petty theft of
public property; evasion of taxation and labour
laws; the active resistance by employers to
unionization.
There are thus already many alternatives to státe
regulatory intervention. Non-legal enforcement is
necessary and cheaper; it's not just a market
response to a defective state law but possibly pre-
dating it and very likely to survive its demise.
These alternatives are not to be regarded with starry
eyes. Private industry and commerce may be cor-
rupt when regulated by government, but they are
not necessarily competitive and efficient when not
regulated. It is sometimes forgotten that rent-seek-
ing originated in markets, where it seems to remain
a fundamental force. Norms and thugs and a
penumbra of exclusive associations are the institu-
tions on which local commercial orderliness rests.
'Deregulation' is thus of marginal importance when
most regulation is not by law or the state but by
reputation, norm and private force. Certain com-
modities will always have to be state-regulated if
only on populist political grounds and in order to
ensure the state's capacity to distribute essential
commodities in emergencies. Others cannot be left
to self-regulation because the collective interest
cannot be served by 'the market', because institu-
tions such as micro-monopolies and collusive oh-
gopolies conflict with mass public interests, because
social goals (such as gender and social justice) are
blatantly not served by non-state regulatory institu-
tions even if they are not well served by the state
either.
Deregulation to date has had a contradictory impact
on the local economy A simplification of paddy
procurement in 1991 resulted in a textbook reduc-
tion in corruption in the Civil Supplies Department,
increased the velocity of transactions, formalized
the previously seasonally illegal long distance, spe-
cialist trade and provoked improvements in quality
However, former strategically sited rent-seekers
such as check-post guards, still survive and flourish
on rents extracted by means of coercion. To this
extent deregulation remains rhetorical. The deli-
cencing of gold, also in 1991, has had a different
impact. In the short term, it raised employment for
goldsmiths at the margin, but it is lately leading to
the domination of a millennia-old skilled artisan
industry by mechanized, capitalist firms in Madras
and their local agents on tied credit lines. The
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displacement of large numbers of highly skilled
local craftsmen is expected.
5 Conclusions
Policy predictions from the New Political Economy
are derived logically from its theoretical analysis
which is derived logically from the definition of
corruption which is deployed. If the Santhanam
Committee's definition of corruption is accepted, as
here, then the analysis which flows from it produces
radically different conclusions. While 'institutional
scarcity' (not only understaffing and under-resourc-
ing - scarcity in institutions - but the scarcity of
appropriate institutions) does indeed encourage
corruption, corruption is not always a clearing
response and the public distribution of goods is not
always inefficient compared with market alterna-
tives. Pace Jagganathan, public agencies are unac-
countable not (only) through administrative
incompetence and institutional scarcity but (also)
by dint of being politically captured. Public opin-
ion does not act as a regulator not because it is
unaware (because it is extensively aware), but
because influential factions of the 'policy elite'
regard what they (have been taught by NPE to)
believe is the market clearing role of corruption as
developmentally efficient.
If the workings of one market town are replicated
widely, then primary accumulation may yet still
characterize the mass of firms in an economy whose
apex is dominated by corporate capital and which is
being penetrated by global capital. Open and black
markets function in similar ways. Primary accumu-
lation is not only historically and logically neces-
sary, it also takes what Marx called 'primitive' forms.
Economic crime is one aspect of this 'primitive'
condition. Corruption is another. But tax evasion
and black investment are likely to be most impor-
tant quantitatively In a society where rent-seeking
is generalized, the epicentre of corruption is not
necessarily the venal official. A shift in the scope of
the state may lead not to the eradication of rent-
seeking but to its redistribution between 'state'
and 'market'. Not for nothing is the Tamil proverb:
'an honest person is one who does not know how
to live'.
We have identified four types of party to corrup-
tion, who may act in contradictory ways:
i Officials. Where demand by officials is the ori-
gin of corruption, then deregulation would not only
reduce the 'supply' of activity amenable to corrup-
tion; it will also reduce the 'demand' for it.
ii Politicians. 1f ministers are at the origin of cor-
ruption (with various chains of money collected for
them and dispensed by them), then deregulation
would simply increase the political competition
over state employees and the resources they com-
mand. Depending on the political gains from
money-collecting corruption, the price of corrupt
transactions could increase. There is no reason to
assume the quantity of corruption would decline if
political corruption is the most prevalent form.
iii Businessmen. Bribes may be supplied without
much coercion as an institutionalized transaction
cost to influence future events. Then neither offi-
cials nor politicians would be the source of cor-
ruption, rather it would stem from 'demand' for
goods, services and preferential non-compliance.
Merchants and business houses fund political parties
on a large scale. They lobby systematically to pro-
tect business from threats; their kin are placed in
politics and in the bureaucracy and they can place
pressure on the police and judiciary Deregulation
by itself would not set conditions requiring a signif-
icant change in such behaviour. Indeed it could
strip the state of its residual capacity to curb it.
iv Lawyers. All the other groups are in positions
to bribe the judiciary to decide and implement in
their favour. Deregulation would not necessarily
reduce such corruption, merely shift its content.
The relations surrounding these four types of 'actor'
are complicated by two facts. First, their role in
relations of corruption is subject to internal contra-
dictions. For the state does have the capacity to
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